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DOES OWNERSHIP MATTER FOR SERVICE DELIVERY VALUE? 
AN EXAMINATION OF CITIZENS’ SERVICE SATISFACTION 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Governments across the world outsource service delivery to external agents, but does 
ownership matter for service delivery value? Though theory points to clear ownership 
differences on effectiveness, there remains limited empirical evidence of the impact of 
ownership on citizens’ satisfaction. Focusing on local authorities in England, we draw on 
secondary data (2007 and 2009) to examine if ownership type matters. The findings indicate 
that ownership–public, nonprofit, private–confers no direct benefits for citizens’ satisfaction 
suggesting that the outsourcing decision should not rely on unfounded assumptions about 
performance differentials between ownership types. The implications for public management 
are explored. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An increasing number of public programs and services are delivered through competitive 
markets and contracts, with a range of external agencies entering service delivery. This 
emphasizes the role that contracting-out is suggested to play in prompting the better 
management of public services (Walker and Andrews 2015). Yet the role of ‘privateness’ in 
service provision still drives debates about the relationship between ownership and service 
performance (for an overview of studies see Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2011a).  
With economic pressures continuing to affect the public sector, local administrations 
turn to alternative organizational forms to balance efficiency and effectiveness in service 
delivery (Zafra-Gómez, Prior, Díaz, Plata, and López-Hernández 2013). This suggests that 
there may be a preferred ownership structure, such that certain local services may be better 
provided by private agents rather than managed by local governments themselves (Walker 
and Andrews 2015). Such a notion implies that a straight switch between modes of ownership 
should lead to observable differences in performance (Andrews et al. 2011a). However, while 
promoting market power in service delivery through greater choice between rival suppliers is 
suggested to significantly enhance economic efficiency, the consequences of ownership for 
other dimensions of performance are less clear (Andrews et al. 2011a) and are particularly 
uncertain for user-centric dimensions such as citizens’ satisfaction. As a result there remain 
unanswered questions about whether ownership matters for service delivery value.  
It is contended that local government choices of ownership are governed by pragmatic 
motivations such as budget reductions and growing demands for public services (Ya Ni and 
Bretschneider 2007), which might explain why governments of both the right and the left 
have encouraged outsourcing of service delivery to external agents. Indeed the publicness 
literature typically only captures economic outcomes (Andersen and Jakobsen 2011) with a 
distinct lack of noneconomic measures (Rho 2013). This is despite a growing need for an 
external focus on customers in service provision (Walker, Brewer, Boyne, and Avellaneda 
2011) as a means to mitigate public service failures (Boyne 2006). For example, whilst public 
sector agencies may seek efficiency, in contrast it is fair to assume that users will place a 
premium on service responsiveness (Walker, Brewer, Bozeman, Moon, and Jiannan 2013). 
Whether one ownership type is more responsive than other equivalent types, or if indeed 
citizens appreciate market solutions more than public in-house delivery remains unclear. 
There is therefore a need to focus more explicitly on citizens’ views towards public services 
in the context of high service liberalization (Jilke and Van de Walle 2013) i.e. outsourcing. 
Focusing on local authorities in England, the study examines the role of ownership 
(public, nonprofit, private) for citizens’ service satisfaction in a single service setting–leisure 
service provision–where high service liberalization has been prevalent. This is different to the 
majority of existing studies on the ownership–performance relationship that focus on ‘simple 
services’ (Andersen and Jakobsen 2011) and is in response to a call by Andrews, Boyne, 
Meier, O'Toole, and Walker (2011b) for a comparison of publicness effects on performance 
in the same industry and over the same time period. Though theory points to clear ownership 
differences on effectiveness (Walker et al. 2013), the study offers much needed empirical 
evidence to test the effects of service liberalization on citizens’ satisfaction (Jilke and Van de 
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Walle 2013), which is the first contribution made to public management theory. In turn, by 
offering analysis of the effects of ownership on citizens’ satisfaction this study goes beyond 
existing economic dimensions, drawing attention to an under examined citizen-perspective 
(Rho 2013), which is the second contribution made.  
The article is structured as follows: first, the publicness–performance relationship is 
reviewed and the features of satisfaction considered. Next, the significance of ownership 
(public, nonprofit, private) for public service delivery in England is examined using 
secondary data on citizens’ satisfaction for 2007 and 2009. Additional analysis then assesses 
whether the degree of collective organizational publicness within local government provision 
influences the level of citizens’ service satisfaction. To close, results and implications are 
discussed in light of the study’s limitations, with future research avenues highlighted. 
 
 
PUBLICNESS 
 
‘Despite dimensional conceptions of publicness, ownership continues to serve as an 
important determinant of organizational behaviour’ (Miller and Moulton 2014: 579), with the 
majority of studies continuing to focus on this single dimension. This is largely owing to both 
the prevalence of external agents in service delivery and ambiguities surrounding their 
performance implications (see for instance Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2008; 
Andersen and Blegvad 2006; Andersen and Jakobsen 2011; O’Toole and Meier 2004; Rho 
2013; Walker et al. 2013; Zafra-Gómez et al. 2013).  
 Ownership as a critical issue for public service performance in England emerged from 
policy intervention from governments of both the right and the left. Under a national 
Conservative administration (1979-1997) services were regularly exposed to the test of the 
market to correct inefficiencies by harnessing the market to maximize returns on taxpayer 
investment, improve government performance, and enhance citizen welfare (Girth, Hefetz, 
Johnston, and Warner 2012). This established the principle that the public sector should not 
necessarily be the sole service provider. In 1997, New Labour (1997-2010) introduced the 
Best Value regime, a statutory framework for ‘modernizing’ local government. The regime 
was intended to promote a mixed economy of service provision as a means to service 
improvement (Entwistle and Martin 2005) and contributed to local government having the 
power to choose who manages local government services; particularly within discretionary 
service fields. This trend continues in practice, with governments of western economies still 
relying on contracting-out to attain performance outcomes (Warner and Hefetz 2012). For 
public leisure services in England, for instance, external agents comprise over half of all 
providers within this functional category.  
Under New Public Management (NPM) externalizing service delivery is a means to 
improve performance (Zafra-Gómez et al. 2013). However, since the literature on ownership 
differences has traditionally focused on simple, non-competitive services, studies that 
examine ownership effects in competitive service delivery settings are sparse (Andersen and 
Jakobsen 2011; Boardman and Vining 1989). As a result, the literature presents mixed 
context-dependent findings on ownership, for example, Andersen and Jakobsen (2011) 
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establish that patient satisfaction is higher for private clinics than their public counterparts; 
Amirkhanyan et al. (2008) show that public and nonprofit organizations outperform their 
private equivalents in nursing home quality; Andersen and Blegvad (2006) report no 
significant differences in the effectiveness (tooth decay prevention) of public and private 
provision in child dental care; Walker et al. (2013) record no differences of significance in 
ownership on governmental performance (efficiency, equity, and probity); O’Toole and 
Meier (2004) observe an insignificant or negative effect of service contracting on school 
outcomes; while Rho (2013) reports that contracting is associated with the improvement of 
public education performance. Despite the ambiguity in research findings, the common 
assumptions that public ownership is associated with lower efficiency and private ownership 
achieves stronger performance have prevailed in public management (Andrews et al. 2011a), 
and while the studies cited have contributed important insights to question such assumptions, 
the possible performance differentials that might exist between ownership types require 
further investigation and particularly whether or not citizens appreciate market solutions 
more.  
There is also a need to acknowledge the presence of collective organizational 
publicness in service delivery. Defined as the aggregate publicness of organizations within a 
shared policy environment–in other words, the proportion of alternate providers in a service 
setting–this can offer additional insights into the outcomes of ownership for local government 
(Miller and Moulton 2014), but investigation of this concept remains in its infancy and its 
implications for public service outcomes are little understood. The environment surrounding 
public leisure organizations is a particularly suitable research setting given the range of 
alternate providers present. These organizations can be described as ‘more private-like’ 
(Hansen and Jacobsen 2016) where performance is dependent upon creating value that 
attracts users (Högström, Davoudi, Löfgren, and Johnson 2016). In this service setting local 
government increasingly contract out their service to other providers (Alonso, Andrews, and 
Hodgkinson 2016), hence by focusing on this single service setting it enables a more 
comparable examination of ownership types that can be considered as operationally similar 
(Andrews et al. 2011b) providing a clearer context to interpret ownership effects on citizens’ 
satisfaction. 
 
 
CITIZENS’ SERVICE SATISFACTION 
 
Satisfaction is defined as the ‘consumer’s or citizen’s summary judgement about the product 
or service’ (Van Ryzin 2006: 601), which is commonly identified as a key dependent variable 
for research into service delivery value (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2011c). In a 
comprehensive review of public service performance, Andrews et al. (2011c) illustrate how 
satisfaction is typically captured as the percentage of citizens satisfied with the overall 
service provided by their local government. So similar to private value, here public value is 
discerned through individual expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction (c.f. Alford 2016). 
This was of particular concern to government during the study time-period where 
administrative emphasis on satisfaction reflected the NPM rhetoric that services should be 
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responsive to public preferences rather than bureaucratic preferences (Andrews et al. 2011c). 
For citizen-facing services such as education, culture and leisure services, transit agencies 
and so forth, public organizations must be more externally-oriented rather than internally 
focused for greater responsiveness to the demands of the citizenry (Hansen and Jacobsen 
2016; Hodgkinson and Hughes 2014). Hence, when creating service delivery value is a 
priority of service provision (Högström et al. 2016) citizens’ service satisfaction becomes a 
key performance measure (e.g. Hansen and Jacobsen 2016). After all, if these ‘customers’ are 
dissatisfied with the service of one provider they can ‘exit’ and switch providers (c.f. Alford 
2016). This is unlike non-competitive public services where alternative providers do not exist.  
There are two emerging tracks of investigation that examine citizens’ service 
satisfaction. Within the first track, in which this study falls, satisfaction is adopted as a 
dependent variable to capture the effects of organization and management variables on 
performance (for a summary of studies see Andrews et al. 2011c). Here, satisfaction is a 
measure of performance in itself. The second track of research views satisfaction as a 
response to government performance and typically draws on expectancy disconfirmation 
theory to examine the process by which citizens’ overall satisfaction is shaped (e.g. Van 
Ryzin 2006, 2007; Poister and Thomas 2011). The point of departure underpinning these two 
tracks of research investigation on satisfaction is inherently different, while the former is 
concerned with the relationship between public management variables and satisfaction (as 
outcome), the latter focuses on how satisfaction is shaped (as process). Though there are clear 
merits to the latter approach, in this study we use citizens’ satisfaction as a dependent 
variable in order to better inform how to manage toward public outcomes given varying 
degrees of publicness in service delivery (Miller and Moulton 2014). 
 
 
STUDY HYPOTHESIS 
 
Jilke and Van de Walle (2013) contend that citizen dissatisfaction in the context of 
liberalization is a complex issue that should be assessed at a disaggregated level, in other 
words focus on a single or small number of services is needed rather than generalizing across 
all forms of service provision. This in principle should also hold for investigations of 
ownership and citizens’ satisfaction. Similarly, while theoretical argument is abundant on 
ownership differences and outcomes, empirical evidence remains weak (Andrews et al. 
2011a). For instance, the literature on ownership effects has neglected more market-like 
service environments (c.f. Andersen and Jakobsen 2011; Boardman and Vining 1989; Hansen 
and Ferlie 2016), which is illustrative of the need to examine ownership and citizens’ 
satisfaction at a more disaggregated level. In light of the complexity of the issue at hand, the 
lack of empirical evidence, ambiguities in effects reported across service settings, and limited 
insights garnered under high liberalization, it is a challenge for hypothesis development of 
ownership–performance differences (Walker et al. 2013). 
In discussing the ownership–performance relationship, Amirkhanyan et al. (2008) 
argue that government will produce the quality and quantity of public goods that is demanded 
by the median voter, but since the demands of a particular individual in a heterogeneous 
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society may exceed that of a median voter, citizens seek services from external providers that 
might better meet their specific needs. This is supported by Andersen and Jakobsen (2011) 
who suggest that because private providers have a stronger incentive to cut costs in order to 
increase profits they will focus on providing elements of service delivery that are demanded 
by users, while reducing those that are not. The assertion is that citizens’ satisfaction should 
increase when service delivery is undertaken by external agents as these providers are 
pressured in to meeting the demands of users for their survival. However, there is insufficient 
evidence to support this since the service experience of citizens across institutional 
arrangements is rarely reported in the literature (c.f. Andersen and Jakobsen 2011; Poister 
and Henry 1994; Miller and Miller 1991). According to the Audit Commission (2006), no 
one ownership type delivers the best overall value for money, or results in more investment, 
or higher levels of participation. However, it is reported that in-house provision receives 
significantly more public funding relative to nonprofit and private ownership, with private 
ownership receiving the least amount of subsidy from local authorities. The transfer of 
facilities to nonprofit ownership has assisted local authorities in avoiding the payment of non 
domestic rates and taxation, however when savings are reinvested they have supported 
maintenance budgets rather than the improvement of facilities (Audit Commission 2006). 
While recent reforms in the UK have prioritized user needs in the choice of service 
delivery vehicle to ensure service responsiveness and user value (Walker et al. 2011), public 
administrators may not necessarily reflect this rhetoric in action, but instead favour 
opportunistic cost-cutting in response to increasingly demanding budgetary targets. This may 
be particularly prevalent among in-house public provision where the degree of political 
control is greater which might influence the relative weight attached to different dimensions 
of performance (Andrews et al. 2011a); e.g. prioritizing service efficiency over citizens’ 
satisfaction as a means to manage budget deficits. Following the theoretical argument that 
ownership will carry differences for service effectiveness (Walker et al. 2013) and on the 
expectation that external agents are more pressured in to meeting citizen demands relative to 
in-house public providers, we hypothesize that:  
 
Citizens’ service satisfaction will be lower for ‘in-house’ public ownership, relative to 
‘external’ nonprofit and private ownership types.   
 
 
METHODS 
 
Data generation 
 
Rather than a comparative study between different types of services that might be more 
private or public respectively, ownership differences are explored between public, nonprofit, 
and private providers that operate in the same functional category: public leisure servicesi. 
Leisure service here refers to a publicly-owned site including a health and fitness suite, 
swimming pool, and/or sports hall, where at least one is available to citizens on a pay and 
play or membership basis. Public sector leisure provision is delivered by NPM-oriented 
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organizations inasmuch as these organizations have greater scope of action, performance-
based budgets, operate in competition, and close if they cannot compete (Hansen and Ferlie 
2016). For instance, as a discretionary service there is high organizational autonomy in how 
goals are reached, high dependency on income generated from the market (as opposed to 
public funding, which has reduced dramatically), and high competition for customers. By 
focusing on a single service setting we minimize the variation and ambiguity in government 
objectives that would further complicate measurement of satisfaction if multiple services 
were considered. Moreover, focusing on a single service setting draws attention to the role of 
ownership types and collective organisational publicness in a shared policy environment (the 
proportion of public, nonprofit, and private organizations providing similar services), which 
is a key area of interest (Miller and Moulton 2014). 
Not only is extending the study of publicness to neglected policy environments 
necessary, it is also important to examine repeat points in time (Miller and Moulton 2014). 
Therefore, we draw on secondary data at two time points that represent two different fiscal 
environments for public leisure services. In 2007 the financial crisis was yet to strike, while 
in 2009 discretionary services faced the full brunt of budgetary cuts. This allows for a 
comparison of the ownership–performance relationship under different fiscal demands. The 
unit of analysis is English local authorities and in 2007 and 2009 public leisure services were 
governed by London boroughs, metropolitan boroughs, unitary authorities and district 
councils in rural areas (Alonso et al. 2016). These comprised a sample of 353 local 
authorities for 2007 and a sample of 318 local authorities for 2009, the difference in sample 
size reflects local government reorganisation in 2009 which reduced the number of 
authorities by 35.  
 
Measures 
 
Ownership type 
As others have, we operationalize publicness through ownership type (e.g. Walker et al. 
2013). Three ownership types are commonly used by local government in their delivery of 
leisure services, these are: (a) single provision by the local authority itself (Public), (b) single 
provision by a third sector trust (Nonprofit), or (c) single provision by a private operator 
(Private) (Audit Commission 2006). Information on ownership types was obtained from the 
Leisure Database Company for 2007 and 2009 for all local authorities in England, and 
ownership type was measured as a percentage of each local authority’s leisure provision.  
 
Citizens’ service satisfaction  
Satisfaction is measured by the percentage of residents who are very or fairly satisfied with 
local authority sports/leisure facilities. Capturing the perceptions of citizens can only be 
achieved by direct surveys of constituents (Andrews et al. 2011c) and two key examples in 
the UK include the Best Value Performance Indicators and The Place Survey, see appendix A 
for more detail on the data sources. The target population specified by government guidance 
for the mail questionnaires was adult local authority residents aged 18 and over. It was a 
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central government mandate that all local authorities in England administer the survey 
questionnaires to their constituents. 
 
Control variables 
Given that citizen complaint behaviour has been shown to be influenced by socio-economic 
factors (Jilke and Van de Walle 2013), it follows that such factors may affect levels of 
satisfaction. Deprivation is controlled for using a pre-calculated average score for each local 
authority across a broad range of issues including income deprivation, employment 
deprivation, health deprivation and disability, education skills and training deprivation, 
barriers to housing and services, living environment deprivation, and crime, sourced from the 
English Indices of Deprivation 2007 and 2010 (Department for Communities and Local 
Government 2007, 2011). The two are based on broadly the same methodology and it is 
possible to compare patterns of deprivation between them (Department for Communities and 
Local Government 2011). Level of service use may also directly impact citizens’ service 
satisfaction (Van Ryzin and Charbonneau 2010), hence we control for service participation 
within each local authority captured as ‘the percentage of residents who have used local 
government provided or supported sports/leisure facilities and events within the last 6 
months’. Data was sourced from the Best Value Performance Indicators and the Place Survey. 
In addition, we controlled for school-based provision (hereafter ‘dual-use’) as a percentage of 
local authority provision. Here schools typically manage the facilities during the school day 
and transfer operational responsibility to other managers for twilight, evening and weekend 
use (Audit Commission 2006). Information on the prevalence of this ownership type in local 
government provision was again sourced from the Leisure Database Company, for 2007 and 
2009. The descriptive statistics for all study variables are listed in appendix B. 
 
Data analysis  
 
Multiple regression analysis is utilized to provide an objective assessment of the relationship 
between ownership types and citizens’ service satisfaction for English local authorities. Two 
regression models are created to examine relationships between ownership type and citizens’ 
satisfaction for 2007 and 2009. Furthermore, acknowledging the presence of collective 
organizational publicness (e.g. Miller and Moulton 2014) multivariate analysis of variance 
with post hoc analysis (Tukey test) is used as additional analysis to examine whether the mix 
of ownership types influences the level of citizens’ service satisfaction. The sample is split at 
low, moderate, and high levels of publicness. We calculate collective organizational 
publicness as the ratio of public ownership to public, nonprofit, and private ownership. This 
is expressed as a percentage. The publicness groups are created by split sample at equal thirds. 
This enables an analysis of significant differences between levels of collective organizational 
publicness (low, moderate, high) on citizens’ satisfaction for 2007 and 2009. 
 
 
RESULTS 
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Table 1 presents the regression results for 2007 and 2009. The study hypothesis is not 
supported when deprivation, participation, and dual-use are controlled for, as no single 
ownership type has a significant direct effect on satisfaction. Satisfaction does appear higher 
in less deprived authorities (β = -5.51; p ≤ 0.01) and in those areas where citizens use leisure 
services more (β = 10.22; p ≤ 0.01). Next, the process is repeated using data on ownership 
and citizens’ service satisfaction for 2009. Once again, when deprivation, participation, and 
dual-use are controlled for, no single ownership type has a direct significant effect on 
satisfaction, thus the study hypothesis is again not supported. Satisfaction still appears higher 
in those areas where citizens use leisure services more (β = 17.23; p ≤ 0.01). The one 
difference to note between 2007 and 2009 is that deprivation no longer holds a significant 
negative relationship with citizens’ satisfaction (β = -.59; ns).  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about Here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Additional analysis 
 
Collective organizational publicness (mix of ownership types) appears to carry no direct 
implications for citizens’ service satisfaction in both time periods, as shown in table 2. There 
was substantial change in the mean values of satisfaction across the two time points, but, 
there are no significant differences at all between the levels of collective organizational 
publicness for satisfaction. This supports the regression results in that ownership does not 
appear to explain citizens’ service satisfaction.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about Here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This paper set out to examine if ownership matters for service delivery value. The findings 
suggest that in competitive and more ‘private-like’ environments outsourcing decisions 
should not be based solely on the expectation of performance differentials between ownership 
types as there is no one best type for managing service provision when citizens’ satisfaction 
is examined. 
The introduction of new forms of ownership in service delivery is frequently 
embraced and justified on the promise of increased efficiency (Andrews and Entwistle 2013) 
with private organizations highlighted as better performers (Andrews et al. 2011a), but there 
is little evidence that NPM practices have enhanced the effectiveness of service provision 
(Andrews and Van de Walle 2013). The frequently asserted injunction that externalization of 
services and market incentives will improve performance in isolation is not supported here 
consistent with previous investigations (Andrews et al. 2011a; Walker et al. 2013). In 
accounting for the role of context in evaluations of public management reforms (Andrews 
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and Van de Walle 2013), the control effects observed support recent findings of a positive 
relationship between service use and citizens’ service satisfaction (Van Ryzin and 
Charbonneau 2010), while in more deprived areas citizens’ service satisfaction suffers which 
may be attributed to there being ‘more complex and intractable social needs’ present 
(Andrews and Van de Walle 2013: 777). 
Reflecting on the additional analysis, low, moderate, and high levels of collective 
organizational publicness do not significantly contribute to explaining differences in citizens’ 
service satisfaction. An explanation for this finding is provided by Miller and Moulton (2014: 
556) who posit that ‘the collective publicness of organizations operating in a shared policy 
environment may shape organizational behaviour through institutional isomorphism and/or 
competitive pressures to conform’. This offers a useful alternative viewpoint to the classical 
discussion of ownership, such that within the same policy field the practices of different 
ownership types may become homogenized over time through mimetic forces minimizing the 
potential for performance differentials based solely on ownership type, thus challenging the 
notion that inherent differences exist between ownership types indefinitely. 
While it has been established in the extant public service performance literature that 
one factor alone cannot explain performance exclusively, given the prevalence of outsourcing 
behavior of local government we would expect to see citizens’ service satisfaction to be at 
least partially effected by ownership type but this is not the case. This puts the focus firmly 
then on what public agencies do rather than focusing simply on the origins of providers. So 
the question stands: what will improve citizens’ satisfaction? Much of the recent research on 
when management matters suggests that public service performance is influenced by strategic 
action, irrelevant of ownership type. Solutions to this issue for instance may be found in the 
work of Hodgkinson and Hughes (2014, 2012) and Hodgkinson, Hughes, and Hughes (2012) 
in that the strategic resource base and relative market orientation of public organizations 
contribute toward explaining performance differentials; while the work of Andrews et al. also 
points to internal variables such as organizational structure and process (Andrews, Boyne, 
Law, and Walker 2009) and vertical strategic alignment (2011b) that may offer further insight 
into explaining performance variation, beyond ownership type. 
Public administrators must appreciate that the outsourcing decision in itself is not 
likely to impact levels of citizens’ satisfaction exclusively and this puts into spotlight why 
outsourcing or externalization of provision alone is often assumed by local government to be 
a means to increase performance (Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge 2009). We suggest that 
policy makers should not rely on simplistic assumptions about the merits (or not) of public, 
private, and nonprofit ownership when making decisions on the best ownership type for 
managing public services, as ownership alone is not significantly related to citizens’ 
satisfaction. However, an assumption is made here that commissioners or contract managers 
care about citizens’ satisfaction, but they may not and so not use this as a decision-making 
factor i.e. the choice to outsource may be focused on cost efficiency or be the result of forces 
within the institutional environment (Alonso et al. 2016). Both the outcomes of contracting-
out services, as well as the drivers of this decision, identified in the public administration and 
management literature emphasize by their very nature an inside-out perspective (Ya Ni and 
Bretschneider 2007) and therefore fail to capture more outside-in market-oriented 
motivations such as responsiveness to the overt and latent needs of users. Thus, in the context 
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of outsourcing, sensitivity of local government to citizens' needs remains unclear, but 
warrants immediate attention if service responsiveness and user value is to be ensured.   
The findings presented have to be considered in light of the study’s limitations. First, 
we rely on data gathered from national surveys administered to the citizenry in general and 
acknowledge that the reported levels of satisfaction for each local authority may be 
influenced by the responses of nonusers. Second, this study is based on two cross-sectional 
research designs and does not allow causality to be asserted from the data. It would be 
preferable to have panel data spanning 5 years or more in order to dynamically identify 
ownership change effects on citizens’ service satisfaction. Third, we operationalize 
publicness through ownership and acknowledge that dimensional publicness is not accounted 
for in this study, which would allow for the possibility that some private organizations may 
be very public. Beyond this, we examine a functional service category that is indicative of 
services provided under market conditions where competitiveness is determined by meeting 
the actual requirements of customers. We therefore cannot generalize our findings to public 
services markedly different to that examined here; but nor should we wish to, since the 
research question explored does not hold relevance for simple services and/or non-
competitive service environments, where service delivery is monopolized.  
Additional evidence is needed on the relationship between ownership and 
performance, and we focus on two avenues for future research. First, a more holistic picture 
of why outsourcing decisions are taken in the first instance is needed to offer a more 
complete view of service outsourcing than is commonly studied within the public 
administration and management fields. Second, existing public administration and 
management literature can provide insights into the ownership–performance relationship but 
does not reveal how change in ownership impacts users, future research should focus on the 
under examined user perspective in seeking service improvement and responsiveness. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study set out to examine whether ownership matters for service delivery value. With 
outsourcing of provision continuing to be a seemingly default response by local government 
to improve service outcomes, the study compares the performance of public, nonprofit, and 
private organizations delivering a similar service, and goes beyond a singular focus on 
efficiency to account for citizens’ service satisfaction. Ownership alone (e.g. public, 
nonprofit, and private) is found to confer no benefits for citizens’ satisfaction suggesting that 
citizens’ satisfaction is not effected by ownership type, or more importantly, the outsourcing 
decision should not rely on unfounded assumptions about the performance potential of 
different ownership types.  
There is, then, a need to move beyond the assumption that inherent differences exist 
between providers of different sector-origins, which are supposed explicators of performance 
improvement, as the findings demonstrate that what matters for citizens’ satisfaction lies with 
what public sector service organizations and their managers do, and not the ownership type 
adopted. With the increasing prevalence of outsourcing in the sector, the question of why 
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outsourcing is so commonly relied upon by local government for service improvement re-
emerges and this warrants investigation. This will require greater clarity about what 
performance comprises to inform ongoing public management debates more generally 
(Andersen, Boesen, and Pedersen 2016) and, specifically, about the role of both ‘privateness’ 
and ‘publicness’ in service provision. 
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Table 1: Ownership and citizens’ satisfaction, 2007 and 2009 
Ownership Type Standardized Coefficients t-value 
2007   
Public .25 1.38 
Nonprofit .13 .85 
Private .09 .66 
   
Control variables   
Deprivation -.26 -5.51** 
Participation .46 10.22** 
Dual-Use .42 .37 
   
Model Statistics  
R2 .29 
23.83** F-Value 
2009  
Public .70 .51 
Nonprofit .58 .47 
Private .50 .45 
   
Control variables   
Deprivation -.02 -.59 
Participation .70 17.23** 
Dual-Use .30 .35 
   
Model Statistics  
R2 .51 
F-Value 52.48** 
Note: **p ≤ .01. 
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Table 2: Ownership mix and citizens’ satisfaction, 2007 and 2009 
 Collective Organizational Publicness† F-ratio Tukey Test (p≤.05) 
 Low Moderate High   
2007 (n = 138) (n = 55) (n = 146)   
Satisfaction 57.76 (7.61) 58.13 (7.92) 58.57 (7.91) .382 NSD 
2009 (n = 155) (n = 43) (n = 139)   
Satisfaction 46.89 (7.49) 44.70 (6.89) 47.17 (7.80) 1.72 NSD 
Note: † Mean values for citizens’ service satisfaction (Standard deviation in parentheses); NSD: no significant 
differences found. 
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 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
2007     
Public .00 100.00 38.12 32.24 
Nonprofit .00 100.00 19.78 28.26 
Private .00 100.00 14.09 23.73 
Satisfaction 29.00 78.00 57.92 7.80 
Control variables     
Deprivation 4.13 46.97 18.99 8.83 
Participation 29.00 63.00 49.46 5.13 
Dual-Use .00 100.00 28.11 19.34 
2009    
Public .00 100.00 34.97 32.22 
Nonprofit .00 100.00 21.52 29.21 
Private .00 100.00 15.44 25.39 
Satisfaction 20.43 69.15 46.55 7.59 
Control variables     
Deprivation 4.47 43.45 19.07 8.40 
Participation 32.50 59.28 47.62 4.87 
Dual-Use .00 100.00 28.10 19.95 
 
Appendix A: Citizens’ service satisfaction data sources, 2007 and 2009 
2007, Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs): Secondary data on satisfaction for 2007 was 
extracted from the perception-based indicators that were part of the performance management 
framework for local authorities. These performance indicators were collected triennially through a 
General User Survey with 2006-07 marking the third (and last) time all local authorities had to collect 
these measures of performance. The questionnaire itself was designed by the Audit Commission for 
the collection of the BVPIs. Altering the wording of questions or omitting questions was prohibited 
since it reduced the ability to benchmark. Data was collected between 1 September and 30 November 
2006 and comprised a first mail out, first reminder questionnaire, and second reminder questionnaire. 
All data was submitted to the Audit Commission by 15 December 2006, with results published in July 
2007 (information provided by Department for Communities and Local Government 2007). 
 
2009, The Place Survey: Secondary data on satisfaction for 2009 was sourced from the Place Survey 
which collected information on 18 national indicators for local government and ran between the 
months of September and December 2008, but was not repeated under the coalition government (from 
2010). Each individual local authority was responsible for running the survey in their local area, using 
a core questionnaire supplied by the Department for Communities and Local Government. The 
accompanying Place Survey manual for local authorities detailed eight common standards that needed 
to be followed when conducting the survey: following the timetable, using the questionnaire template, 
using the appropriate sampling method, using a correct sampling frame, using a common method of 
data collection (postal), maximizing response rates, achieving a sufficient sample to enable 
statistically reliable data, and submitting results using templates and tools provided on a dedicated 
Place Survey website. There was no evidence that specific sections of the population or any particular 
localities had been underrepresented, and results were published in June 2009 (information provided 
by Department for Communities and Local Government 2009). 
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i Note: As we assured the three anonymous reviewers, we confirm that the analysis was only performed for 
leisure services and was not conducted on any other service settings. 
